

IC Key  
DCI/IC 75-1798  
Hawes  
(1)

15 OCT 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General John A. Wickham, Jr.  
Military Assistant  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: U.S./Soviet Military Exchange Visits

1. My long-standing interest in military exchange visits with the Soviets caused me to take particular notice of recent communications with Moscow on this topic. Upon noting these exchanges, I presented my views and recommendations to the DCI in a memorandum, a copy of which I am attaching (Tab A).

2. The DCI agreed with the recommendations in paragraph 6 of that memorandum. In a follow-up to paragraph 6.1., the National Intelligence Daily (15 September 1975) carried an article (Tab B) on the topic. Since that memorandum was written and while preparing action on its other recommendations, I learned of the ISA reply of 19 September (copy at Tab C) discouraging present initiative from our side but noting agreement with the general proposition that exchange visits are useful. In the meantime, I also learned informally that at the Secretary of Defense level such exchange proposals are viewed favorably and that there apparently is agreement that some arrangement for future visits is to be worked out. This is a most welcome development.

3. Please let me reaffirm that the DCI and I strongly support efforts to promote such high-level exchanges, for the reasons outlined in my memorandum, and that we would appreciate any information you can give us on progress in this direction. We would be happy to be of assistance to



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your office or others who are working on this problem to the end that maximum political and intelligence advantage will accrue to the U.S. from any exchanges that might be developed.




Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

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Attachments:

- A. Memo dtd 12 Sep 75
- B. NID article dtd 15 Sep 75
- C. ISA message dtd 19 Sep 75

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Distribution (DCI/IC )

O-Addressee

1-D/DCI/IC chrono

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DCI/IC/HB/1: cr  (10 Oct)

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DCI/IC 049-75

12 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : US/USSR Exchange of High-Level  
Military Visits

1. The attached cable (tab 1) is the most recent in a long series of communications between the Defense Attache Office, Moscow, and Washington, on the subject of Soviet interest in an exchange of high-level military visits. In my view, we have neglected to focus policy-level attention on this subject in the past and, therefore, the lack of any movement in this area can be laid more to default than to deliberate decision. I consider such an approach to be fallacious and propose that we might endeavor to use the present instance to have the subject fully ventilated at the appropriate policy level.

2. During my two-year tour as Defense and Army Attache in Moscow, 1971-73, the subject of military-to-military visitations came up with representatives of the Soviet high command on a number of occasions. Although I reported these conversations faithfully to Washington, I was never successful in getting a substantive response of any kind to relate to the Soviets, with one rather unique exception which I cover below. It was clear to me that my high-level Soviet military conferees were both puzzled and somewhat distressed at this lack of reaction.

3. In September 1971, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Foreign Liaison Office (UVS), a high-level KGB officer masquerading as a Colonel, Soviet Artillery, discussed with me in some detail the desirability/feasibility of an exchange of U.S. and Soviet officer students between the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and Frunze Academy in Moscow (the Soviet equivalent of C&GSC). After months of delay, during which I needled Washington for a response, I was instructed not to pursue the subject further. Following the signing of the Incident at Sea Agreement in Moscow during the U.S. Presidential visit in May 1972, the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko,

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stated to the then Secretary of the U.S. Navy that, in his opinion, the time had come to consider a meeting between the Soviet and U.S. Ministers of Defense. The same message was conveyed to me by the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Kazatonov, and separately by the Chief of the Soviet Foreign Liaison Office, Major General Sokolov. Subsequently, the same subject was raised to me in a chance conversation with General Kulikov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, in a fleeting conversation at an official reception. Grechko himself again posed the desirability of a meeting with Secretary of Defense Laird in an aside to me on the evening of 25 May 1972 at an official banquet where Dr. Kissinger, Marshal Grechko, Arbatov of the USA Institute, and I were seated together along with a number of other ranking Soviet political and military figures at the same table. All of this was duly reported to Washington. Grechko awaited some kind of response from Secretary Laird throughout the summer of 1972, but Washington was silent. Finally, early in October an "eyes only" message to me on this subject from the U.S. Secretary of Defense was received in the Moscow DAO. (Parenthetically, it contained explicit instructions to me not to reveal the existence of this message to the U.S. Ambassador.) Secretary Laird, whose pending departure from his post had already been rumored, was proposing a meeting between himself and the Soviet Minister of Defense prior to the U.S. Presidential elections in November. (I subsequently learned that the drafter of the message was Larry Eagleburger, then the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.) Grechko by this time was considerably piqued at the lack of any U.S. response to his proposal, apparently comprehended the lame-duck status of Secretary Laird, no doubt noted the timing of Laird's proposal (coincidental with the upcoming Presidential elections) and scorned making any response whatsoever.

4. In the period since my return from Moscow, the overall subject of exchanges of visits has come up at Soviet initiative a number of times with U.S. Military and Naval Attaches in Moscow. One such proposal is reflected in a cable message (tab 2) from the Defense Attache in Moscow, 15 April 1975, concerning a US/Soviet exchange of Army guest lecturers. My information as of mid-June was that this matter was still under consideration by the Soviet Desk at the Department of State. ASD/ISA attitudes on the proposal were reported as "not enthusiastic." As a result, the Army Attache in Moscow was advised by Army/ACSI that the matter is "under study."

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5. The most recent development in this subject area is reflected in attachment #1, a U.S. Defense Attache message from Moscow, dated 10 September 1975, which reflects alleged interest on the part of General of the Army Kulikov in visiting the United States. I am simply afraid that unless someone, perhaps ourselves, can get this question brought into focus at the policy level, the U.S. response will be similar to those which have occurred in the past.

6. I am convinced that this kind of exchange between the U.S. and Soviet military is, in a word, "healthy." The potential for any kind of intelligence loss is minimal and the opportunity to gain a greater appreciation for current Soviet military thought is rather singular. For this reason, I would propose that we consider either:

- a. raising this subject as an item for comment and discussion at the upcoming meeting of USIB; or
- b. possibly developing a brief article on this overall subject in The National Intelligence Daily in order to gain some attention; or
- c. a note from you to the Secretary of Defense and State, which I will be happy to provide; or
- d. all of the above.

  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

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Attachments  
as stated

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### OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EO/ICS	10/2	M
2	AD/DCI/IC		
3			
4	D/DCI/IC		
5			
6	C/HB/ICS	8 OCT 1975	

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

**Remarks:**

Helen:  
 Suggest [redacted] re-sign  
 "original" memo to DCI and  
 resigned original be copied  
 & included in package to Gen Wickham  
 7.9

*CR - return in  
 final Watson memo  
 to Watson. None  
 in pass to dispatch. 18*

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
	20 Oct 75

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BACKGROUND  
CORRESPOND.

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